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Abstract
The query algorithms are a very convenient model for quantum com-
plexity studies. In the thesis we study query algorithms for functions
based on full Hamming codes and Reed-Solomon codes.
We show a way to construct exact quantum query algorithms for the
both sets of functions and compare their complexity to the complexity
of the most efficient deterministic algorithms.
Our algorithm for a Hamming code function of m = 2n − 1 argu-
ments needs 3/4 ·m queries to return the value of the function, which
is 25% less than the classical complexity.
We achieve even better complexity improvement for the functions
based on Reed-Solomon code. We show how to construct exact quan-
tum query algorithm which needs only m/2 queries when the function
has an even number m of arguments. This is a 50% improvement
against the classical complexity and this repeats the best known im-
provement by exact quantum query algorithms.
We also prove a polynomial lower bound for the both sets of func-
tions. For Hamming code this bound is 2n−2, for Reed-Solomon code
it is n · 2n−2.
We find an optimal adversary lower bound of Hamming code func-
tions of three and seven arguments. This gives us a tight lower bound of
two queries for the former function and a lower bound of three queries
for the latter. Both these lower bounds are higher then the respective
polynomial lower bounds.
Anota¯cija
Vaica¯josˇie algoritmi ir viens no e¯rta¯kiem model¸iem kvantu sarezˇg´¯ıt¯ıbas
pe¯t¯ıˇsanai. Promocijas darba¯ ir pe¯t¯ıti vaica¯josˇie algoritmi funkcija¯m,
kuras ir ba¯ze¯tas uz pilniem Heminga un R¯ıda-Solomona kodiem.
Me¯s ra¯da¯m ka¯ uzkonstrue¯t eksaktos kvantu vaica¯josˇos algoritmus
aba¯m funkciju kopa¯m un sal¯ıdzina¯m vin¸u sarezˇg´¯ıt¯ıbu ar visefekt¯ıva¯ko
determine¯to algoritmu sarezˇg´¯ıt¯ıbu.
Heminga koda funkcijai no m = 2n − 1 argumentiem mu¯su algo-
ritmam pietiek ar 3/4 · m kvantu vaica¯jumiem lai atgrieztu funkcijas
ve¯rt¯ıbu, kas ir par 25% maza¯k neka¯ klasiska¯ sarezˇg´¯ıt¯ıba.
Me¯s sasniedzam ve¯l liela¯ku sarezˇg´¯ıt¯ıbas uzlabojumu funkcija¯m ba¯ze¯-
ta¯m uz Rı¯da-Solomona kodiem. Me¯s para¯dam ka¯ uzkonstrue¯t ek-
sakto kvantu vaica¯josˇo algoritmu, kuram pietiek ar m/2 vaica¯jumiem
kad funkcijai ir pa¯ra skaits m argumentu. Tas ir 50% uzlabojums
sal¯ıdzina¯juma¯ ar klasisko sarezˇg´¯ıt¯ıbu un tas atka¯rto vislaba¯ko zina¯mo
uzlabojumu eksaktiem kvantu vaica¯josˇiem algoritmiem.
Me¯s piera¯da¯m ar¯ı polinomia¯lo apaksˇe¯jo nove¯rte¯jumu aba¯m funkciju
kopa¯m. Heminga kodiem sˇis nove¯rte¯jums ir 2n−2, Rı¯da-Solomona kodiem
– n · 2n−2.
Me¯s atrodam optima¯lo apaksˇe¯jo nove¯rte¯jumu ar ”adversary” metodi
Heminga koda funkcija¯m no trim un septin¸iem argumentiem. Pirmajai
funkcijai tas dod ciesˇo apaksˇe¯jo nove¯rte¯jumu, ka ir nepieciesˇami divi
vaica¯jumi. Apaksˇe¯jais nove¯rte¯jums otrai funkcijai ir tr¯ıs vaica¯jumi. Abi
sˇie nove¯rte¯jumi ir laba¯ki, neka¯ attiec¯ıgie nove¯rte¯jumi ar polinomia¯lo
metodi.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
We will be researching quantum algorithms and their complexity. Al-
most all known quantum algorithms can be expressed in a query model
where the input is given by a black box which answers queries in a cer-
tain form.
Classical algorithms also can be expressed in a query form. This
gives us a possibility to compare the two models and see whether we
can get any improvements by allowing quantum operations.
Query algorithms may be of different types. The main classifica-
tion is in probability of returning a correct result. There are exact and
probabilistic algorithms. Exact algorithms always return correct re-
sult. Probabilistic algorithms, in contrast, either return a result which
is correct with some probability or always return a correct result, but
there is a probability of returning ”unknown”.
The best improvements were achieved with probabilistic algorithms.
This is actually one of the main reasons why quantum computation
become popular and got a lot of support. The other reason is cryp-
tography and secure communication, but this is out of scope of this
9
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research.
The most attractive and most referenced improvements were pre-
sented by Peter Shor [Sh 97] and Lov Grover [Gr 96]. We’re not going
to talk much about these algorithms, but I still think that it’s worth
to explain what problems they are solving.
Shor’s algorithm solves integer factorization problem in a polyno-
mial time of integer’s size. You may already know that this is an
exponential improvement over a best known classical algorithm. So,
it’s practically impossible to factorize a large integer by a classical
computer and modern cryptography heavily relies on this fact. The
Shor’s algorithm gained its popularity by the fact that it can break
current cryptography model and make our digital communication in-
secure. Quantum cryptography addresses this issue, but again, I will
not go into much details as it is out our scope.
Now consider a problem of searching. The setup is that we have
an unsorted database of N entries and want to find a specific entry in
this database. Classically, in the worst case, we need to check value of
each element before we find the one we are looking for. Grover found
an algorithm which will use just O(
√
N) queries to solve this problem
in a quantum setting.
As I already mentioned, the algorithms above are of a probabilistic
nature, most of the time they will return correct result, but there will
be a probability of error.
In the thesis we are going to concentrate on the exact algorithms.
There are surprising results in this area also.
The most interesting and attractive result was achieved for the fol-
lowing algorithmic problem introduced by Deutsch [De 85]. Informally
it is a very simple problem of guessing whether a given coin is genuine
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(with head on one side and tail on the other) or fake (with both sides
the same). The question is how many times we need to look at the coin
to find out which case it is. In the classical world twice, to both sides.
In the quantum world only once, but to a quantum superposition (of
both sides).
Cleve, Ekert, Macchiavello and Mosca [CE+98] were the first who
presented how to solve the above problem with one quantum query.
We will use their result for constructing our algorithms.
This was the first result which achieved a 50% improvement for an
exact algorithm. You may notice that this improvement is not as big
as for probabilistic algorithms. So the question is whether we can do
better? The reality is that since that time nobody provided a better
gap, and there are not many algorithms achieving even the same result.
You may ask if it possible at all? At least this is the question
which motivates this thesis. Nobody has the answer. There are sev-
eral methods to calculate lower bounds for specific functions: poly-
nomial [BB+01], adversary [Am 02], and different variations of adver-
ary [BSS 03, HLS 07]. For many functions even the first polynomial
method provides high enough lower bounds being above the thresh-
old of 50%, but for some functions lower bounds are below it. The
Deutsch’s problem is one of the former functions, so it is not interest-
ing any more to try to improve its algorithm.
Obviously we are interested in the latter functions when trying to
find an algorithm with a better improvement. In fact there is not
so many of them known (see [NS 94, Am 03, NW 95, AF 03] for the
examples).
We will introduce functions based on Hamming and Reed-Solomon
error correcting codes. We will construct exact query algorithms for
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them and compare complexities between quantum and classical ver-
sions. We will find lower bounds by polynomials and for some spe-
cial cases also adversary lower bounds. We’ll see the calculated lower
bounds are below 50% threshold and so the functions are promising in
the sense of existence of faster algorithm for processing them.
We will get 25% complexity improvement for Hamming code func-
tions and 50% for Reed-Solomon functions. The latter repeats the
result of solving the Deutsch’s problem and still leaves a possibility of
further improvement.
Chapter 2
Preliminaries
In this chapter we consider notations, definitions and well-known or
elementary facts, referenced directly or indirectly further in the thesis.
We refer to [Am 04] for the wording of most definitions in sections 2.1,
2.2 and 2.3.
2.1 Notation
[N ] denotes the set {1, . . . , N}.
We use ⊕ to denote XOR (exclusive OR). If x1 ∈ {0, 1}, x2 ∈ {0, 1},
x1⊕x2 denotes XOR of bits x1, x2. If x1 ∈ {0, 1}n, x2 ∈ {0, 1}n, x1⊕x2
denotes bitwise XOR of n-bit strings x1 and x2. We use + to denote
the usual addition of integers.
We use the O and Θ notation [CLR 90] standard in computer sci-
ence. Let f(N) and g(N) be functions defined on positive integers N
and taking positive values. We say that f = O(g) if there exists a
constant c such that f(N) ≤ cg(N). We say that f = o(g) if, for any
c > 0, there exists N0 such that f(N) ≤ cg(N) for all N > N0. We say
13
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that f = Ω(g) if there exists c > 0 and N0 such that f(N) ≥ cg(N)
for all N > N0.
2.2 Quantum Computing
We introduce the basic model of quantum computing. For more details,
see textbooks by Gruska [Gr 99] and Nielsen and Chuang [NC 00].
2.2.1 Quantum States
We consider finite dimensional quantum systems. An n-dimensional
pure quantum state is a vector |ψ〉 ∈ Cn of norm 1. We use |0〉, |1〉, . . .,
|n− 1〉 to denote an orthonormal basis for Cn. Then, any state can be
expressed as |ψ〉 = ∑n−1i=0 ai |i〉 for some a0 ∈ C, a1 ∈ C, . . . , an−1 ∈ C.
Since the norm of |ψ〉 is 1, ∑n−1i=0 |ai|2 = 1.
We call the states |0〉 , . . . , |n− 1〉 basis states. Any state of the form∑n−1
i=0 ai |i〉 is called a superposition of |0〉 , . . . , |n− 1〉. The coefficient
ai is called amplitude of |i〉. A quantum system can undergo two basic
operations: a unitary evolution and a measurement.
2.2.2 Unitary Evolution
A unitary transformation U is a linear transformation on Ck that pre-
serves the l2 norm (i.e., maps vectors of unit norm to vectors of unit
norm). If, before applying U , the system was in a state |ψ〉, then the
state after the transformation is U |ψ〉.
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2.2.3 Measurements
In the thesis, we just use the simplest case of quantum measurement.
It is the full measurement in the computational basis. Performing
this measurement on a state |ψ〉 = a0 |0〉 + . . . + an−1 |n− 1〉 gives
the outcome i with probability |ai|2. The measurement changes the
state of the system to |i〉. Notice that the measurement destroys the
original state |ψ〉 and repeating the measurement gives the same i with
probability 1 (because the state after the first measurement is |i〉).
2.3 Query Models
Query algorithms are used for computing functions of form f : {0, 1}n →
{0, 1}m. We will mostly consider boolean functions, that is those func-
tions where m = 1.
In this model the boolean function is known, but arguments are
kept in ”black box”. The aim is to compute the value of function
making as less queries to ”black box” as possible.
In the classical computation query algorithms are usually referenced
as decision trees [Pa 94, BW 02]. The decision trees notation is not
widely used for quantum algorithms as they don’t have an explicit tree
structure in most cases.
2.3.1 Deterministic Decision Tree
A deterministic decision tree is a rooted ordered binary tree T . Each
internal node of T is labeled with a variable xi and each leaf is labeled
with a value 0 or 1. For given input x ∈ {0, 1}n the evaluation starts
at the root. If the current node is a leaf then the evaluation stops.
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Otherwise the variable xi that labels the current node is queried. If
xi = 0, then left subtree will be recursively evaluated, if xi = 1 then
the right one. The output of the tree is the value (0 or 1) of the leaf
that is eventually reached. A deterministic decision tree computes f
if its output equals f(x), for every x ∈ {0, 1}n. The complexity of
the decision tree is its depth, i.e., the number of queries made on the
worst case input. It usually coincides with the number of arguments
of function f and it never exceeds this number.
Definition 2.1. The decision tree computes Boolean function
f : {0, 1}n → {0, 1} if for each input tuple X = (x0, x1, ..., xn−1),
computation goes to accepting leaf if f(X) = 1 and the computation
ends in the rejecting leaf, if f(X) = 0.
Definition 2.2. Decision tree computes Boolean function f(X) with
complexity k if k is the number of oracle queries in the worst case (k
is the depth of decision tree).
Definition 2.3. The decision tree complexity D(F ) of the Boolean
function f(X) is complexity of the best decision tree that computes
f(X).
2.3.2 Quantum Query Model
There are two ways to define the query box in the quantum model.
The first is an extension of the classical query. It has two inputs i,
consisting of dlogNe bits and b consisting of 1 bit. If the input to the
query box is a basis state |i〉 |b〉, the output is |i〉 |b⊕ xi〉. If the input is
a superposition
∑
i,b ai,b |i〉 |b〉, the output is
∑
i,b ai,b |i〉 |b⊕ xi〉. Notice
that this definition applies both to the case when the xi are binary and
CHAPTER 2. PRELIMINARIES 17
to the case when they are k-valued. In the k-valued case, we just make
b consist of dlog2ke bits and take b⊕xi to be bitwise XOR of b and xi.
In the second form of quantum query (which only applies to prob-
lems with {0, 1}-valued xi), the black box has just one input i. If the
input is a state
∑
i ai |i〉, the output is
∑
i ai(−1)xi |i〉. While this form
is less intuitive, it is very convenient for use in quantum algorithms.
We will mostly use this second form in the thesis. This is possi-
ble to do because a query of the second type can be simulated by a
query of the first type [Gr 96]. Conversely, an oracle of the first type
can be simulated by a generalization of the sign oracle which receives∑
i ai,b |i〉 |b〉 as an input and outputs
∑
i ai(−1)b·xi |i〉 |b〉.
A quantum query algorithm with T queries is just a sequence of
unitary transformations
U0 → O → U1 → O → . . .→ UT−1 → O → UT
on some finite-dimensional space Ck. U0, U1, . . . , UT can be any unitary
transformations that do not depend on the bits x1, . . . , xN inside the
black box. O are query transformations that consist of applying the
black box to the first logN + 1 bits of the state. That is, we represent
basis states of Ck as |i, b, z〉. Then, O maps |i, b, z〉 to |i, b⊕ xi, z〉. We
use Ox to denote the query transformation corresponding to an input
x = (x1, . . . , xN).
The computation starts with the state |0〉. Then, we apply
U0, Ox, . . . , Ox, UT and measure the final state. The result of the com-
putation is the rightmost bit of the state obtained by the measurement
(or several bits if we are considering a problem where the answer has
more than two values).
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The quantum algorithm computes a function f(x1, . . . , xN) if, for
every x = (x1, . . . , xN) for which f is defined, the probability that the
rightmost bit of UTOxUT−1 . . . OxU0 |0〉 equals f(x1, . . . , xN) is at least
1−  for some fixed  < 1/2. The exact quantum algorithm computes
a function with probability 1, i.e.  = 0.
The complexity of the quantum algorithm that computes f is a
number of queries used by the algorithm. The quantum query com-
plexity of function f is the complexity of the best quantum algorithm
that computes f . We denote it by Q(f). We denote the exact quantum
query complexity by QE(f).
2.4 The Deutsch Algorithm
Our quantum query algorithms employ the Deutsch algorithm [De 85,
CE+98] solving the XOR problem in a single query, where any classical
algorithm makes at least two. This algorithm is exact. It can be
described by the one qubit scheme→ H → O(x1, x2)→ H → where H
is the Hadamard gate, and O(x1, x2) is the (only) oracle query encoding
the answer in the phase:
H =
(
1√
2
1√
2
1√
2
−1√
2
)
, O(x1, x2) =
(
(−1)x1 0
0 (−1)x2
)
If given |0〉 in the input, this scheme produces |x1 ⊕ x2〉 in the
output with probability 1.
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2.5 Lower Bound Methods
We consider the both main techniques for proving lower bound on
quantum query complexity.
The first technique is the polynomial method introduced in [BB+01].
This approach is algebraic and follows earlier very successful work on
classical lower bound by polynomials [Be 93, Re 97].
The other technique is the adversary method originally developed
by Ambainis [Am 02] with roots in the hybrid method of [BB+97].
It has proven to be a versatile technique, with formulations given by
various authors in terms of spectral norms of matrices [BSS 03], weight
schemes [Am 03, Zh 04], and Kolmogorov complexity [LM 04]. Spalek
and Szegedy showed that all these versions of the adversary method are
in fact equivalent [SS 05]. In 2007, Hoyer, Lee, and Spalek developed
a new version of the adversary method using negative weights which
is always at least as powerful as the standard adversary method, and
can sometimes give better lower bounds [HLS 07].
We will use the spectral formulation of the adversary bound as this
version best expresses similarity between the standard and negative
adversary methods.
2.5.1 Lower Bound by Polynomials
The quantum complexity of f is related to representing Boolean func-
tions by polynomials.
For any Boolean function f(x1, . . . , xN), there is a unique multilin-
ear polynomial p(x1, . . . , xN) such that f(x1, . . . , xN) = p(x1, . . . , xN)
for all x1, . . . , xN ∈ {0, 1}. For example, the function f(x1, x2) =
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x1 OR x2 has polynomial x1 + x2− x1x2. The exact degree of f is just
the degree of the corresponding polynomial p. We denote it by deg(f).
The degree can be used to determine a lower bound of f . It’s proved
that D(f) ≥ deg(f) and QE(f) ≥ deg(f)/2 [BB+01].
2.5.2 Spectral Adversary
We refer to the method’s definition in [CL 08].
In this formulation the value of the adversary method for a function
f is given by
ADV (f) := max
Γ≥0
Γ 6=0
||Γ||
maxi||Γ ◦Di|| , (2.1)
where Γ is a square matrix with rows and columns indexed by the
possible inputs x ∈ S ⊆ {0, 1}n, constrained to satisfy Γ[x, y] = 0 if
f(x) = f(y); Di is a zero/one matrix with Di[x, y] = 1 if xi 6= yi and
0 otherwise; A ◦ B denotes the Hadamard (i.e. entrywise) product of
matrices A and B; and Γ ≥ 0 means that the matrix Γ is entrywise
non-negative.
The negative adversary method is of the same form, but removes
the restriction to non-negative matrices in the maximization. Thus the
value of the negative adversary method for a function f is given by
ADV ±(f) := max
Γ6=0
||Γ||
maxi||Γ ◦Di|| . (2.2)
The relation of these adversary bounds to exact quantum query
complexity is the following: QE(f) ≥ 12ADV ±(f) ≥ 12ADV (f).
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2.6 Galois Fields
We refer to [Bl 83] for the definitions of Galois Fields, associated terms
and facts.
Definition 2.4. A field is a set F together with two operations over
this set - addition and multiplication, denoted accordingly by + and ·,
such that the following axioms hold:
 Closure of F under addition and multiplication:
∀a, b ∈ F : a+ b ∈ F & a · b ∈ F
 Associativity of addition and multiplication:
∀a, b, c ∈ F : a+ (b+ c) = (a+ b) + c & a · (b · c) = (a · b) · c
 Commutativity of addition and multiplication:
∀a, b ∈ F : a+ b = b+ a & a · b = b · a
 Additive and multiplicative identity:
∃! 0 ∈ F∀a ∈ F : a+ 0 = a
∃! 1 ∈ F∀a ∈ F : a · 1 = a
 Additive and multiplicative inverses:
∀a ∈ F∃ − a ∈ F : a+ (−a) = 0
∀a 6= 0 ∈ F∃a−1 ∈ F : a · a−1 = 1
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+ 0 1
0 0 1
1 1 0
· 0 1
0 0 0
1 0 1
Table 2.1: GF(2).
+ 0 1 2
0 0 1 2
1 1 2 0
2 2 0 1
· 0 1 2
0 0 0 0
1 0 1 2
2 0 2 1
Table 2.2: GF(3).
 Distributivity of multiplication over addition:
∀a, b, c ∈ F : a · (b+ c) = (a · b) + (a · c)
The most common field examples are:
 Real numbers
 Rational numbers
 Complex numbers
Definition 2.5. Finite or Galois field is a field with finite number of
elements. If the number of elements in the field is q then the field is
denoted by GF (q).
See tables 2.1, 2.2, 2.3 for examples of Galois fields.
Notice that in the GF(4) addition is not by modulus 4, and multi-
plication is also not by modulus 4.
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+ 0 1 2 3
0 0 1 2 3
1 1 0 3 2
2 2 3 0 1
3 3 2 1 0
· 0 1 2 3
0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 2 3
2 0 2 3 1
3 0 3 1 2
Table 2.3: GF(4).
In order to construct Galois fields we need to know how to con-
struct addition and multiplication tables. First we can begin with the
definition of a polynomial over a Galois field and associated definitions.
Definition 2.6. Polynomial over GF (q) is a mathematical expression
f(x) = fn−1xn−1 + fn−2xn−2 + . . .+ f1x+ f0, where x is a free variable,
coefficients belong to GF (q), indices and powers are integers.
Zero polynomial is a polynomial f(x) = 0.
Reduced polynomial is a polynomial with higher coefficient fn−1 is
equal to 1.
Two polynomials are equal if all their coefficients fi are equal.
Definition 2.7. Sum of polynomials is defined as
f(x) + g(x) =
∞∑
i=0
(fi + gi)x
i
Definition 2.8. Multiplication of polynomials is defined as
f(x)g(x) =
∑
i
(
i∑
j=0
fjgi−j)xi
Definition 2.9. Primary polynomial is a reduced polynomial which
can be divided only by itself or by 1.
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Degree Primary polynomial Degree Primary polynomial
2 x2 + x+ 1 14 x14 + x10 + x6 + x+ 1
3 x3 + x+ 1 15 x15 + x+ 1
4 x4 + x+ 1 16 x16 + x12 + x3 + x+ 1
5 x5 + x2 + 1 17 x17 + x
3 + 1
6 x6 + x+ 1 18 x18 + x7 + 1
7 x7 + x3 + 1 19 x19 + x5 + x2 + x+ 1
8 x8 + x4 + x3 + x2 + 1 20 x20 + x3 + 1
9 x9 + x4 + 1 21 x21 + x2 + 1
10 x10 + x3 + 1 22 x22 + x+ 1
11 x11 + x2 + 1 23 x23 + x6 + 1
12 x12 + x6 + x4 + x+ 1 24 x24 + x7 + x2 + x+ 1
Table 2.4: The primary polynomials over GF (2). All the polynomials
are primitive.
Table 2.4 lists primary polynomials over GF(2). These polynomials
can be used to construct larger fields GF (2m), where m is the degree
of a polynomial.
To get Galois field from the table 2.4 it’s needed to take a polyno-
mial of degree m (let’s denote it by pm) and to make a set consisting
of polynomials by modulus pm.
All the polynomials p(x) from the table 2.4 are primitive - that
means that x can be used as a primitive element in a field constructed
as a polynomials by modulus p(x). We define a primitive element
below.
Definition 2.10. GF (q) primitive element is such an element α that
all field’s elements except zero can be expressed as a power of α.
For instance, 2 is a primitive element of GF (5): 21 = 2, 22 = 4,
23 = 3, 24 = 1.
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Another example of a primitive element x (now it’s in a polynomial
form) for fieldGF (4), constructed as polynomials by modulus x2+x+1.
The calculations below are by modulus x2 + x+ 1:
x1 = x
x2 = x+ 1
x3 = x(x+ 1) = 1
Definition 2.11. Let GF (Q) be an extension of GF (q) and β ∈
GF (Q). The polynomial f(x) of a lowest degree over GF (q) with prop-
erty that f(β) = 0 is called an element’s β minimal polynomial over
GF (q).
The main properties of Galois fields:
1. Elements count in any Galois field is a power of prime number.
2. For any prime number p and positive integer m the smallest
GF (pm) subfield is the field GF (p). Elements of GF (p) are called
a field’s GF (pm) integers, and p - a characteristic.
3. For Galois fields of characteristic 2, it is true for each element β
that −β = β.
4. For any prime number p and positive integer m always exists a
Galois field of pm elements.
5. Every Galois field contains at least one primitive element.
6. There is always at least one primitive polynomial of any positive
power over each Galois field.
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7. Each primitive element has a primary minimal polynomial over
any subfield.
8. Two Galois fields with the same number of elements are isomor-
phic.
9. for any q which is a power of a prime number, and any positive
integer m field GF (q) is a subfield in GF (qm), but GF (qm) is an
extension of field GF (q).
10. If n is not dividing m then GF (qn) is not a subfield of GF (qm)
11. For any element of GF (qm) the power of minimal polynomial
over GF (q) divides m.
Chapter 3
Hamming Codes
Hamming codes were introduced in [Ha 50] and very soon they became
common knowledge for everybody in computer science. They contain
many symmetries and other good properties, and so are used widely
in the theoretical computer science.
Hamming distance between two n-bit vectors a and b is the number
of the positions at which these vectors differ. Hamming weight of a
vector is defined as the number of 1’s in it.
In this thesis we will use Hamming codes correcting one error. They
can be defined as 0-1 N -vectors where N equals 2n−1 for some integer
n > 1, with the following property: i1 ⊕ i2 ⊕ . . . ⊕ im = 0 where
i1, i2, . . . , im ∈ [2n−1] are the positions (or indices) of 1’s in the vector,
and ⊕ is the bitwise addition modulo 2 of the binary representations
of numbers from [2n− 1]. In total there are 22n−n−1 such code vectors.
See tables 3.1 and 3.2 for the valid Hamming codewords of size three
and seven.
Another way of checking whether a 0-1 N -vector (x1, . . . , xN) is a
correct Hamming code is to verify whether n checksums are equal to
27
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X1 X2 X3
0 0 0
1 1 1
Table 3.1: The valid Hamming codewords of size three.
X1 X2 X3 X4 X5 X6 X7
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 1 0 0 0 0
1 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 1 1 1 1 0 0
0 1 0 1 0 1 0
1 0 1 1 0 1 0
1 1 0 0 1 1 0
0 0 1 0 1 1 0
1 1 0 1 0 0 1
0 0 1 1 0 0 1
0 1 0 0 1 0 1
1 0 1 0 1 0 1
1 0 0 0 0 1 1
0 1 1 0 0 1 1
0 0 0 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 3.2: The valid Hamming codewords of size seven.
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0. Let jnjn−1 . . . j1 be the binary representation of a variable index j.
The variable xj is present in the m-th checksum iff jm = 1. This gives
us the following checksums:
x1 ⊕ x3 ⊕ . . .⊕ x2n−3 ⊕ x2n−1 = 0− the first checksum
x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ . . .⊕ x2n−2 ⊕ x2n−1 = 0− the second checksum
. . .
x2n−1 ⊕ x2n−1+1 ⊕ . . .⊕ x2n−2 ⊕ x2n−1 = 0− the nth checksum
We will need one more representation of the same verification schema
to prove lower bound by polynomials of Reed-Solomon code functions
in the section 4.4.
Lemma 3.1. Hamming code can be verified by multiplying the input
variable vector [x1 . . . xN ] by a checking matrix Λ of N rows and n
columns. The code is correct if the multiplication’s result is equal to
zero-vector.
Moreover, each row of the matrix Λ is unique and the rows are all
possible n-bit vectors except zero-vector.
Proof. We construct the checking matrix based on the variable indexes.
It has N rows and n columns. Its jth row corresponds to an index j
by representing it in a binary form in such a way that the value in
column m equals to jm from the binary representation of j. In other
words it can be written as Λj,m = jm, where j = jnjn−1 . . . j1, j > 0.
Multiplying a code-word vector by Λ and verifying that the result is
a zero-vector is exactly the same as verifying the checksums in the
verification method above.
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Since each row of Λ represents a distinct j all the rows are unique.
Presence of all possible n-bit vectors follows from the fact that N =
2n − 1, which is exactly the number of distinct n-bit non-zero vectors.
The following is a sample checking matrix for Hamming code of
seven arguments:
Λ =

100
010
110
001
101
011
111

3.1 Deterministic Query Algorithm for
Hamming Codes
In this and the following sections we denote N = 2n − 1.
We define a Boolean function f(b1, . . . , bN) equal to 1 on Hamming
code vectors and equal to 0 otherwise.
Theorem 3.2. D(f) = N .
Proof. The all-zero vector is a correct Hamming code (all checksums
are 0), while any vector containing exactly one 1 is not a Hamming
code (the checksums containing the only 1 are equal to 1). Thus,
receiving only zeroes in answers to the queries for variable values, the
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deterministic algorithm needs to query allN variables before producing
result 1: to ascertain that no argument is equal to 1.
The visualization of the deterministic algorithm for the function of
seven arguments can be seen on figure 3.1.
3.2 Quantum Query Algorithm for
Hamming Codes
Theorem 3.3. There is an exact quantum query algorithm with com-
plexity 3 · 2n−2 − 1 for the function f .
Proof. We use verification of checksums to construct the algorithm.
Each checksum consists of 2n−1 variables. So we need 2n−2 queries
to compute it using the Deutsch 1-query algorithm for XOR of two
variables. For example, we query x1 ⊕ x3, x5 ⊕ x7, . . . , xN−2 ⊕ xN to
compute the first checksum x1 ⊕ x3 ⊕ . . .⊕ xN .
While calculating checksums, we query for XOR of pairs of vari-
ables. Some pairs will occur in more than one checksum. We will save
several queries by asking such pairs only once and by remembering
results of these queries. It remains to calculate how many queries we
save in such way.
Let us analyze checksums starting with the second one, i.e. the
checksums which control variables whose index binary representation
contains 1 in positions 2, 3, . . ..
If a variable with even index 2i belongs to such checksum, then the
variable with index 2i + 1 also belongs to this checksum (because the
binary representations of the indices of these variables differ only in
the last bit).
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X1
X2
0
X2
1
X3
0
X3
1
X4
0
X4
1
X5
0
1
X6
   0
1
0
X7
   0
1
0
   0
1
01
X5
X6
    1
0
0
X7
    1
0
0
    1
0
01
X5
0
1
X6
   1
0
0
X7
   1
0
0
   0
1
01
X5
X6
    0
1
0
X7
    0
1
0
    1
0
01
...
...
 
 
Figure 3.1: A deterministic query algorithm for the Hamming code
function of seven arguments.
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In total we have (2n − 2)/2 = 2n−1 − 1 such pairs (2i and 2i + 1).
Thus we can compute XOR of all these pairs with 2n−1 − 1 queries,
and knowing their XOR we can verify all checksums starting from
the second one. Additionally we make 2n−2 queries to verify the first
checksum. So we make 2n−1 − 1 + 2n−2 = 3 · 2n−2 − 1 queries to verify
all checksums and thus evaluate the function.
As an example, let us construct such algorithm for the function
f(x1, . . . , x7). Valid keywords are:
0000000 1110000 1001100 0111100
0101010 1011010 1100110 0010110
1101001 0011001 0100101 1010101
1000011 0110011 0001111 1111111
Checksums to be verified:
x1 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x7 = 0
x2 ⊕ x3 ⊕ x6 ⊕ x7 = 0
x4 ⊕ x5 ⊕ x6 ⊕ x7 = 0
Variable pairs to be asked: x2 ⊕ x3; x4 ⊕ x5; x6 ⊕ x7; x1 ⊕ x3;
x5 ⊕ x7.
Figure 3.2 visualizes the quantum algorithm for the Hamming code
of size seven.
3.3 Lower Bound by Polynomials
Now we will find the degree of f which helps us to prove the lower
bound by polynomials.
CHAPTER 3. HAMMING CODES 34
X1 ⊕ X3
X5 ⊕ X7
X5 ⊕ X7
0
1
0
1
0
X2 ⊕ X3
X6 ⊕ X7
X6 ⊕ X7
0
1
1
0
1
0
00
X4 ⊕ X5
0
1
0
X2 ⊕ X3
0
1
0X6 ⊕ X7
X6 ⊕ X7
0
1
1
0
10
1
0
0
X4 ⊕ X5
0
1 0
1
X4 ⊕ X5
0
1
0
1
X4 ⊕ X5
0
1
0
1
 
Figure 3.2: A quantum query algorithm for the Hamming code func-
tion of seven arguments.
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Theorem 3.4. deg(f) = 2n−1.
Proof. The polynomial of f can be expressed as p(x1, . . . , xN) =∑
b:f(b)=1
∏
i:bi=1
xi
∏
i:bi=0
(1− xi). In the following we will refer to the
elements of this sum as “the summands”. Thus each summand corre-
sponds to a particular Hamming code vector b.
Now, let us open all the parentheses (1− xi) expressing each sum-
mand as a sum of one or more monomials (referred so in further) of
the kind
∏
xi with (non-zero) coefficients. Let us investigate in which
summands can a particular monomial occur. If a monomial from a
summand does not contain a particular variable xj, it means that the
summand contained a factor (1−xj) (otherwise all its monomials would
contain xj). And, vice versa, the presence of the factor (1− xj) in the
summand means that the summand’s monomials can be split into pairs
which differ only in the presence/absence of the variable xj.
Thus, for I ⊆ [N ], the monomial ∏i∈I xi occurs exactly in the
summands with such b that ∀j ∈ [N ] \ I (bj = 0), and the coefficient
of the monomial in each occurrence is 1 or −1.
Suppose that card(I) > 2n−1. We will show that, in the whole sum,
the monomial has coefficient 1 exactly as many times as coefficient
−1, resulting in the canceling of the monomial. How is the sign of a
monomial obtained? When opening parentheses in a summand, −1
appears only when we pick the −xi from a factor (1 − xi) to obtain
the monomial. If there is an even number of such −xi picked, the
coefficient of the monomial is 1, otherwise it is −1. We must pick −xi
from (1− xi) iff i ∈ I. Thus, coefficient is −1 iff the number of zeroes
among bi, i ∈ I is odd. Since, as we established, bi = 0 for i /∈ I, two
possible monomial coefficients 1 and −1 correspond to two opposite
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parities of the number of 1’s in the code vector of the summand.
Thus, it is enough to prove that among the Hamming codes with 0’s
in all the positions not from I, the number of codes with even Hamming
weight must coincide with the number of codes with odd Hamming
weight. It is enough to prove that among these there is a code c with
Hamming weight 3, since then, due to the linearity of Hamming codes,
all these codes can be split into pairs (b, b⊕c), with opposite Hamming
weight parities. By definition, a 0-1 vector with weight 3 and 1’s in
positions i, j, k is a Hamming code iff i⊕ j ⊕ k = 0. Select an i ∈ I.
Now all the positions from [N ] \ {i} are split into 2n−1 − 1 pairs (j, k)
with the property i ⊕ j ⊕ k = 0. Since card([N ] \ I) ≤ 2n−1 − 2, at
least one of these pairs (j, k) gives a triple i, j, k ∈ I with i⊕ j⊕k = 0.
Upper bound proved.
It remains to show that there is a monomial with card(I) = 2n−1
and non-zero coefficient. A Hamming code b must satisfy b1 ⊕ b3 ⊕
. . . ⊕ bN = 0. Hence the number of 1’s in the positions from I =
{1, 3, . . . , N} must be even. Since card(I) = 2n−1 is even, also the
number of 0’s in positions from I is even, and the corresponding mono-
mial occurs in the sum only with coefficients +1 and thus cannot cancel
(and it occurs at least once - for the all-zero Hamming code).
Corollary 3.5. The lower bound by polynomials for Hamming code
function is: QE(f) ≥ 2n−2.
We continue the research with finding adversary bounds for Ham-
ming codes.
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3.4 Adversary Bounds for Hamming Codes
We will be following the principles from [CL 08] when applying the
adversary method to Hamming codes.
Finding the value of the adversary method is as an optimization
problem. To analyze the adversary bound for hamming codes, we will
use symmetry to simplify this problem. The same simplification applies
to both the standard and negative adversary bounds, so we treat the
two cases simultaneously.
Suppose we are trying to design a good adversary matrix Γ, and
are deciding what weight to assign the (x, y) entry. Intuitively, it
seems that if (x, y) and (x′, y′) are related by an automorphism, then
they should look the same to an adversary, and hence should be given
the same weight. The automorphism principle states that there is an
optimal adversary matrix with this property. Although this principle
does not provide any advice about what weight to give a particular
pair (x, y), it can vastly reduce the optimization space by indicating
that the adversary matrix should possess certain symmetries.
Definition 3.6. ([HLS 07]) Let G be a group of automorphisms for a
function f . We say that G is f -transitive if for every x, y such that
f(x) = f(y), there is pi ∈ G such that pi(x) = y.
Theorem 3.7. (Automorphism principle [HLS 07]) Let G be a group
of automorphisms of f . There is an optimal adversary matrix Γ for
which Γ[x, y] = Γ[pi(x), pi(y)] for all pi ∈ G and x, y. Furthermore,
if G is f -transitive then Γ has a principal eigenvector β for which
β[x] = β[y] whenever f(x) = f(y).
There are two types of automorphisms in the automorphism group
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of Hamming code function:
1. ”Linear” automorphism. Linearity of the Hamming codes means
that we can add one Hamming codeword to another and the
result will still be a valid Hamming codeword. Each valid Ham-
ming codeword h forms an automorphism which maps vector v
to another vector v ⊕ h. If v is a valid Hamming code, then and
only then v ⊕ h is also a valid Hamming code.
2. ”Cyclic” automorphism. It’s well known that the Hamming
codes are cyclic codes ([Bl 83]). This means that there is a cyclic
operator φ which maps a Hamming code h of length N to another
Hamming code φ(h) and by applying this operator N times we
get the h again: φN(h) = h.
Theorem 3.8. The group G of ”linear” and ”cyclic” automorphisms
of a Hamming code function of N arguments is f -transitive.
Proof. We get N+1 distinct groups of code vectors. The first group F0
consists of all valid Hamming codewords. This group can be generated
by applying each of the ”linear” automorphisms to codeword of all-
zeros. Obviously, we can transform a codeword s ∈ F0 to another
codeword t ∈ F0 by applying sequentially two automorphisms which
are accordingly based on s and t: s⊕ s⊕ t = t.
The rest N groups Fi are generated by applying the ”linear” auto-
morphisms to code vector containing just one ”1” in position i and all
zeros in other positions. These groups are distinct as they are based
on distinct starting vectors and we can’t get another vector with ham-
ming weight 1 by applying the ”linear” automorphisms to the starting
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vector (just because there is no any valid Hamming codeword of weight
2).
Since we have a ”cyclic” automorphism then for each i, j we can
transform elements from Fi into elements of Fj by applying a ”shift”
automorphism necessary number of times.
This means that we can transform any element fi ∈ Fi into element
fj ∈ Fj which together with the transitivity of F0 elements is the
condition for the automorphism group G to be f -transitive.
By following the automorphism principle 3.7 we can assume with-
out loss of generality that the number of distinct entries in matrix Γ is
at most the number of elements in F0, which is number of distinct valid
codewords. Hamming code of N = 2n − 1 arguments has 2n − n− 1
valid codewords. Let’s denote this number by size(N). So we will have
at most size(N) distinct entries in Γ.
Let’s take a look into the structure of Γ.
Lemma 3.9. The row Γ[z, ], corresponding to all-zeros codeword, con-
sists of size(N) zeros and size(N) distinct elements each of them ap-
pearing exactly N times.
Proof. The row z has size(N) zeros in the columns corresponding to
valid codewords, because by definition Γ has a constraint that if f(x) =
f(y), then Γ[x, y] = 0.
Some of the columns correspond to cyclically isomorphic code vec-
tors. By cyclically isomorphic code vectors I mean such code vectors
which can be got from one another by applying the ”cyclic” automor-
phism.
Entries corresponding to columns of cyclically isomorphic code vec-
tors will be equal between one another. We can see this by having
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x = 0 . . . 0 and pi equal to ”cyclic shift” operator when applying the
equation from the automorphism principle:
Γ[0 . . . 0, y] = Γ[shift(0 . . . 0), shift(y)] = Γ[0 . . . 0, shift(y)]
Lemma 3.10. The row Γ[v, ], corresponding to a valid codeword v,
consists of exactly the same elements as the row Γ[z, ], permuted across
columns.
Proof. We can use the ”linear” automorphisms to see the structure
for the other rows corresponding to valid codewords. For a valid code-
word v and corresponding ”linear” automorphism we have the following
equation: Γ[v, x] = Γ[v ⊕ v, x⊕ v] = Γ[z, x⊕ v].
Lemma 3.11. The rows of Γ corresponding to not valid code vectors
consist of N · size(N) zeros and size(N) distinct elements.
Proof. These rows will have zeros in all columns corresponding to not
valid code vectors. The columns which correspond to valid codewords
will have size(n) distinct entries.
Theorem 3.12. If u is not a valid code vector of a Hamming code of
N arguments, then sum of the entries in the uth row of Γ is equal to
σ =
∑
i∈S
Γ[u, i] =
∑
j∈H
γj, where S is a set of all possible code vectors;
H is a set of all valid codewords.
For the valid codeword v the sum of the entries in the vth row of Γ
is equal to σ ·N .
Proof. The proof follows from lemmas 3.9, 3.10, and 3.11.
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Following is the sample Γ matrix for the Hamming code of size
three:
Γ =
00
0
00
1
01
0
01
1
10
0
10
1
11
0
11
1
0 γ1 γ1 γ2 γ1 γ2 γ2 0
γ1 0 0 0 0 0 0 γ2
γ1 0 0 0 0 0 0 γ2
γ2 0 0 0 0 0 0 γ1
γ1 0 0 0 0 0 0 γ2
γ2 0 0 0 0 0 0 γ1
γ2 0 0 0 0 0 0 γ1
0 γ2 γ2 γ1 γ2 γ1 γ1 0

000
001
010
011
100
101
110
111
Theorem 3.13. Matrix Γ of a Hamming code function of N arguments
has a principal eigenvector β for which β[x] =
√
N whenever f(x) = 1,
and β[x] = 1 whenever f(x) = 0.
Proof. Since we proved theorem 3.8 we can follow the second part of
the automorphism principle 3.7 and construct the principal eigenvector
β. It will have distinct entries a and b corresponding accordingly to
valid and invalid Hamming code vectors.
By the definition of eigenvector it needs to satisfy the following
equality:
Γβ = λβ, (3.1)
where λ is the corresponding eigenvalue.
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We have
Γβ = Γ

a
b
...
b
a
 =

bσN
σa
...
σa
bσN
 = σ

bN
a
...
a
bN
 (3.2)
and
λβ = λ

a
b
...
b
a
 (3.3)
We get the following dependency for a and b if we put 3.2 and 3.3
into 3.1:
{
σbN = λa
σa = λb
⇒
{
σbN = λ
2b
σ
a = λbσ
⇒
{
σ2bN = λ2b
a = λbσ
⇒
{
b(σ2N − λ2) = 0
a = λbσ
λ = ±σ
√
N (3.4)
a = ±b
√
N
Since in this case sign of entries doesn’t affect modulus of λ we can
chose both a and b to have the same sign:
a = b
√
N
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We construct β, by having a =
√
N, b = 1.
Theorem 3.14. ||Γ|| = |σ√N |.
Proof. The proof follows from the fact that Γ is symmetric by design:
Γ[x, y] = Γ[y, x].
Since Γ is symmetric, its norm is equal to the modulus of eigenvalue
of a principal eigenvector, which we already expressed in the equation
3.4.
Now we know the value of the numerator in formula 2.2. Let’s now
take a look on the denominator maxi||Γ ◦Di||.
Transitivity of the automorphism group implies that all matrices
Γ ◦ Di have the same norm ([HLS 07]), so it is sufficient to consider
Γ ◦D1. Considering the example of N = 3, we have
Γ ◦D1 =

0 0 0 0 γ1 γ2 γ2 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 γ2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 γ2
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 γ1
γ1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
γ2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 γ2 γ2 γ1 0 0 0 0

This matrix consists of two disjoint, symmetrical blocks, so its spec-
tral norm is simply the spectral norm of one of those blocks.
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3.4.1 Optimal Adversary Bounds for Hamming Code
of Three Arguments
We can find the norm of the Γ ◦D1 for the case when N = 3.
Theorem 3.15. For the Hamming code of three arguments (N = 3)
the norm of Γ ◦D1 =
√
γ21 + 2γ
2
2
Proof. First we can reverse the order of columns. This operation
doesn’t change the norm, but it makes the matrix to be symmetric. For
symmetric matrix the norm is just the biggest eigenvalue (by absolute
value).
In order to find the eigenvalues we need to solve the the following
equation:∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−λ γ2 γ2 γ1
γ2 −λ 0 0
γ2 0 −λ 0
γ1 0 0 −λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −γ2
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
γ2 0 0
γ2 −λ 0
γ1 0 −λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣− λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
−λ γ2 γ1
γ2 −λ 0
γ1 0 −λ
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
= −γ22λ2 + λ4 − λ2γ21 − λ2γ22
= λ4 − 2λ2γ22 − λ2γ21 = 0
This equation has four solutions. Two of them are λ1,2 = 0. The other
two solutions are the following:
λ3,4 = ±
√
γ21 + 2γ
2
2
Which means that the norm of the matrix is
√
γ21 + 2γ
2
2 .
Theorem 3.16. The optimal adversary and optimal negative adver-
sary bounds of Hamming code function of three arguments are equal to
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3√
2
:
ADV ±(Hamming(3)) = ADV (Hamming(3)) =
3√
2
Proof. The formula for the standard adversary bound is (2.1):
ADV (f) := max
Γ≥0
Γ 6=0
||Γ||
maxi||Γ ◦Di|| ,
From the transitivity of automorphism group and from theorems 3.14
and 3.15 it follows that without loss of generality the formula can be
reduced to a more simple form:
ADV (Hamming(3)) = max
Γ≥0
Γ6=0
(γ1 + γ2)
√
3
||Γ ◦D1|| = maxΓ≥0
Γ 6=0
(γ1 + γ2)
√
3√
γ21 + 2γ
2
2
.
In this case we cannot get any improvement from allowing negative
entries in Γ, so we can safely assume that ADV ± = ADV .
The formula reaches it’s maximum when γ1 = 2γ2:
ADV ±(Hamming(3)) = ADV (Hamming(3)) =
(2γ2 + γ2)
√
3√
(2γ2)2 + 2γ22
=
3√
2
.
The same result can be achieved by solving a positive semidefinite
optimization problem of maximizing γ1 + γ2 subject to constraint that
I − Γ ◦D1 and I + Γ ◦D1 are positive semidefinite.
Now, knowing the adversary bound we can tell the lower bound for
quantum exact algorithm.
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Corollary 3.17.
QE(Hamming(3)) =
ADV (Hamming(3))
2
=
3
2
√
2
≈ 1.06...
This means that minimal number of queries for an exact algorith is
2, so our algorithm for Hamming code of three arguments is optimal.
3.4.2 Optimal Adversary Bounds for Hamming Code
of Seven Arguments
Γ for the Hamming code of seven arguments consists of 16 distinct
non-zero entries γ1 . . . γ16. This fact follows from lemmas 3.9, 3.10,
and 3.11.
So the optimization problem for finding the adversary bounds can
be formulated as following:
maximize
∑
i∈{1,...,16} γi
subject to constraint that I − Γ ◦ D1 and I + Γ ◦ D1 are positive
semidefinite, and γi ≥ 0
Let’s try to simplify the problem. First of all because of its symmet-
ric structure, if Γ◦D1 has an eigenvalue λ, then it also has an eigenvalue
−λ. This means that we don’t need both conditions I − Γ ◦ D1 and
I + Γ ◦ D1. It’s enough to have just one of them. If one of them is
true, then the other one is also true.
As a second simplification we can reduce the number of distinct
entries by proving that some of γi are equal. We can prove that there
is an automorphism which can permute bits in a code vector in such
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a way that we can get all code vectors of the same weight just by
applying a permutation to one of them.
We can permute parity bits and according data bits of a valid code-
word and still get another valid codeword. If we permute two parity
bits then we also need to permute those data bits which are checked by
the two parity bits. This gives us the new automorphism group with
the following permutations:
abucvwx→ baucwvx
abucvwx→ cbwavux
abucvwx→ acvbuwx
abucvwx→ cavbwux
abucvwx→ bcwauvx
It’s just a matter of checking case by case to see that with these
automorphisms it’s possible to get any not valid code vector of the same
size from any other not valid vector of the same size. The same is true
for valid codewords, but we already knew it before as the code is cyclic.
This property means that if hammingWeight(i) = hammingWeight(j)
then Γ[0, i] = Γ[0, j]. Since there are only 6 distinct weights of code
vectors, we can reduce number of distinct entries of Γ to six.
Now the optimization problem is reduced to the following:
maximize γ1 + 3γ2 + 4γ3 + 4γ4 + 3γ5 + γ6
subject to constraint that I − Γ ◦ D1 is positive semidefinite, and
γi ≥ 0
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For the negative adversary the constraint for entries to be not neg-
ative is removed:
maximize γ1 + 3γ2 + 4γ3 + 4γ4 + 3γ5 + γ6
subject to constraint that I − Γ ◦D1 is positive semidefinite
We will find the solutions for the both problems by using Matlab
together with Sedumi package. The program’s source code is attached
to the thesis in appendix A.
We get the following results for standard adversary:
γ1 = 2/
√
10
γ2 = 1/
√
10
γ3 = γ4 = γ5 = γ6 = 0
The norm of Γ ◦ D1 is equal to 1 when applying the calculated
values.
We can find the optimal standard adversary by using the calculated
values:
ADV (Hamming(7)) = (γ1 + 3γ2 + 4γ3 + 4γ4 + 3γ5 + γ6)
√
7
= (2/
√
10 + 3/
√
10)
√
7
= (5/
√
10)
√
7
≈ 4.18...
This gives the lower bound of quantum exact complexity of QE ≥
2.09
The values for negative adversary are also calculated, they are not
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in so nice form though:
γ1 ≈ 0.6412
γ2 ≈ −0.0042
γ3 ≈ −0.0283
γ4 ≈ 0.2572
γ5 ≈ 0.0902
γ6 ≈ −0.0287
The optimal negative adversary is a little bit bigger than the stan-
dard one:
ADV ±(Hamming(7)) = (γ1 + 3γ2 + 4γ3 + 4γ4 + 3γ5 + γ6)
√
7
≈ (0.6412− 4 ∗ 0.0042− 3 ∗ 0.0283 + 3 ∗ 0.2572
+ 4 ∗ 0.0902− 0.0287)
√
7
= 1.6432
√
7
≈ 4.3475
It means that QE ≥ 2.17.
Chapter 4
Reed-Solomon Codes
Reed-Solomon codes were introduced in [RS 60]. These codes are be-
ing used widely in communication, storage devices (CD, DVD) etc.
Reed-Solomon codes are a subset of BCH codes and are linear block
codes [BC 60, Ho 59]. A Reed-Solomon code is specified as RS(l, k)
with n-bit symbols. Here l = 2n − 1. RS(l, k) codeword consists of k
data symbols and l − k parity symbols (all symbols consist of n bits):
 
A Reed-Solomon decoder can correct up to t erroneous symbols per
codeword, where 2t = l − k.
The simplest example of such code is the RS(7, 5) code. It has
l = 7, k = 5, n = 3, t = 1.
In the thesis we will investigate functions based on Reed-Solomon
codes correcting one error. It means that t = 1.
50
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4.1 Constructing a codeword
In this section we will learn how to construct Reed-Solomon codewords.
Assuming we have data to encode, how do we calculate parity symbols?
The short answer is that parity symbols are obtained by getting
remainder of dividing data symbols with the generating polynomial
of Galois field GF (2n). GF arithmetics is used for dividing. Let’s go
ahead and learn it in more details.
Each symbol in the code is considered as an element from Galois
Field. Any word A1A2A3A4 . . . An can be expressed as a polynomial
A1X
n−1A2Xn−2 . . . An, where Xi are just formal multipliers to denote
different types of variables which cannot be added to one another.
Polynomial operations, such as addition, multiplication and deletion
happen the same way as in case of normal polynomials, the only differ-
ence is that coefficients are added and multiplied following the Galois
Fields rules.
If we have word D and we want to get a codeword in Reed-Solomon
RS(n, k) encoding then we will do the following:
1. Add r = n − k zeros to the word D from the right side. In the
terms of polynomials, we are multiplying the polynomial by Xr.
So as the result of this step we get a new polynomial DXr.
2. Divide the polynomial DXr by generating polynomial G and get
a remainder R, such that DXr = GQ+R, where Q is a quotient
which we will ignore as we are interested only in the remainder.
3. Add remainder R to the initial word D. As a result we get
a codeword C which data symbols are stored separately from
parity symbols R.
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Power of Polynomial Binary Decimal Minimal
primitive element represent. represent. polynomial
0 0 000 0
α0 1 001 1 x+ 1
α1 z 010 2 x3 + x+ 1
α2 z2 100 4 x3 + x+ 1
α3 z + 1 011 3 x3 + x2 + 1
α4 z2 + z 110 6 x3 + x+ 1
α5 z2 + z + 1 111 7 x3 + x+ 1
α6 z2 + 1 101 5 x3 + x2 + 1
Table 4.1: The summary of GF(8).
The Galois Fields arithmetics is explained in section 2.6.
Let’s construct the field GF (23) and use it for getting sample code-
word of code RS(7, 5).
4.1.1 The Field GF (23)
The field GF (23) is a superfield of GF(2), which means that it’s char-
acteristic is two and for each β it’s true that −β = β. We will use the
primitive polynomial of degree three from table 2.4: x3 + x + 1. We
will use x as a primitive element.
In [Bl 83] there is a very convenient way of representing the prop-
erties of Galois fields . We will use the same representation here. It is
shown in table 4.1
The table is constructed in the following way. We get polynomials
by raising z to respective power by modulus z3 + z + 1. Binary rep-
resentation is obtained from the polynomials as a concatenation of its
coefficients. Decimal representation is just an equivalent of binary rep-
resentation in decimal system. Finally, minimal polynomial is taken in
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such a way that by applying it to according polynomial its value is 0
(by modulus z3 + z + 1).
For instance element z+1 has a minimal polynomial x3+x2+1. We
get the following result when evaluating the polynomial by substituting
x with z + 1. The calculation done is by modulus z3 + z + 1:
(z + 1)3 + (z + 1)2 + 1 = (z + 1)(z2 + 1) + (z2 + 1) + 1
= z3 + z2 + z + 1 + z2 + 1 + 1
= z3 + z + 1 = 0
When having such a representation, the multiplication and deletion
can be done as easy as:
αiαj = αi+ j(mod7)
αi/αj = αi− j(mod7)
Addition is equivalent to XOR.
Multiplication can also be represented as a vector multiplication by
matrix ([Ma 89]). The list of multiplication matrices is shown in table
4.2.
For instance multiplication 011 · 101 can be performed in the fol-
lowing way:
[
100
]0 1 00 0 1
1 0 1
 = [100]
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· [000] · [001] (α0) · [010] (α1) · [011] (α3)0 0 00 0 0
0 0 0
 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
 0 1 11 0 0
0 1 0
 1 1 11 1 0
0 1 1

· [100] (α2) · [101] (α6) · [110] (α4) · [111] (α5)1 1 00 1 1
1 0 0
 0 1 00 0 1
1 0 1
 1 0 11 1 1
1 1 0
 0 0 11 0 1
1 1 1

Table 4.2: Multiplication matrices of GF(8)
4.1.2 Sample Codewords
Before continuing further investigation, let’s consider two examples
of Reed-Solomon codewords. The first example will be for the code
RS(7, 5), the second - for the code RS(7, 3).
Let’s take a data to be 12345. Now we will find the codeword
for RS(7, 5) code. To get the parity symbols we need to divide the
data symbols by the generating polynomial of GF(8). The generating
polynomial of GF(8) is x2 + 6x + 3. The codeword will be in format
12345XX, where XX is the remainder of diving 1234500 by 163. We
will use the long division procedure to find the remainder. For easier
application of the division we will use the addition and multiplication
tables of GF(8) (see tables 4.3 and 4.4 accordingly).
1 2 3 4 5 0 0 |1 6 3
1 6 3 |1 4 5 0 1
4 0 4
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+ 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 1 0 3 2 4 5 7 6
2 2 3 0 1 6 7 4 5
3 3 2 1 0 7 6 5 4
4 4 5 6 7 0 1 2 3
5 5 4 7 6 1 0 3 2
6 6 7 4 5 2 3 0 1
7 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
Table 4.3: The addition table of GF(8).
· 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2 0 2 4 6 3 1 7 5
3 0 3 6 5 7 4 1 2
4 0 4 3 7 6 2 5 1
5 0 5 1 4 2 7 3 6
6 0 6 7 1 5 3 2 4
7 0 7 5 2 1 6 4 3
Table 4.4: The multiplication table of GF(8).
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4 5 7
5 3 5
5 3 4
0 1 0 0
1 6 3
6 3
We got the remainder 63. So the codeword is 1234563.
Now let’s take a word 123 and find a codeword for the RS(7, 3)
code. We do it by getting the remainder of dividing 1230000 by 13123:
1 2 3 0 0 0 0 |1 3 1 2 3
1 3 1 2 3 |1 1 1
1 2 2 3 0
1 3 1 2 3
1 3 1 3 0
1 3 1 2 3
1 3
We got the remainder 13 which means that the codeword is 1230013.
4.2 Deterministic Query Algorithm for Reed-
Solomon Codes
In this and the following sections we denote N = n(2n − 1).
We define a Boolean function f(b1, . . . , bN) equal to 1 on Reed-
Solomon code vectors and equal to 0 otherwise.
Theorem 4.1. D(f) = N .
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X1
X2
0
X2
1
X3
1
Xn-2
0
1
Xn-1 0
Xn 0
01
Xn-2
Xn-1 0
Xn 0
01
...
...
...
 
Figure 4.1: A deterministic query algorithm for the Reed-Solomon
code function RS(7, 5) of 21 arguments.
Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of Theorem 3.2.
The visualization of the deterministic algorithm for the function of
21 arguments can be seen on figure 4.1
4.3 Quantum Query Algorithm for Reed-
Solomon Codes
Lemma 4.2. Reed-Solomon code can be verified multiplying the input
variable vector [x1 . . . xN ] by matrix Λ of N rows and n columns. The
code is correct if the multiplication’s result is equal to zero-vector.
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Proof. We can find out from [Pe 60], that syndrome can be used to ver-
ify Reed-Solomon code. This syndrome’s formula is: S = X1α
2n−2 +
. . .+X2n−1α0 where Xi are codeword’s n-bit symbols, α is GF’s prim-
itive element.
The code is correct if S = 0.
To prove the lemma we can represent the syndrome as a multipli-
cation of matrices:
[
X1 . . . X2n−1
]
×
 α
2n−2
...
α0

Here we can replace Xi with its binary representation. It is known
from [Ma 89] that multiplication in GF (2n) can be represented as a
multiplication with matrix (See table 4.2 for the list of multiplication
matrices in GF (8)). So we can also replace αi with multiplication ma-
trix n × n for this αi. As a result we get matrix Λ which consists of
multiplication matrices for each element of GF. Here is the multiplica-
tion we obtain after all replacements:
[
x1 . . . xn . . . xN−n+1 . . . xN
]
×

λN
...
λN−n+1
...
λn
...
λ1

If a result of this multiplication is zero-vector then the syndrome
S = 0 and so [x1 . . . xN ] is a correct Reed-Solomon codeword.
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Lemma 4.3. The rows of the matrix Λ are all possible n-bit vectors
except zero-vector, moreover each vector occurs exactly n times.
Proof. If we take the rows with indices 1, n+ 1, 2n+ 1, . . . , N − n+ 1
of the matrix Λ we will meet between them each vector from [00...01]
to [11...11]. It is implied by the fact that if we multiply [10...00] with
all elements of GF, we should get the same elements exactly once as a
result. The same is true for each row sequence i, n + i, . . . , N − n + i
where i ∈ [n]
For example, let’s take Reed-Solomon code RS(7, 5). Here n = 3,
l = 7 and k = 5. Each codeword consist of l × s = 7 × 3 = 21
bits (function f is of 21 variables). Matrix Λ will be of 21 rows and
3 columns. Rows of the matrix are all possible 3-bit vectors except
zero-vector, and each vector occurs exactly 3 times:
Λ =
 01
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
1
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
0
0
1
0
1
0
0
0
1
0
0
0
1

T
Theorem 4.4. There is an exact quantum query algorithm for function
f with complexity N/2 for even n.
Proof. We will use the method described in Lemma 4.2 and Lemma 4.3
for constructing the algorithm. We have a codeword and the matrix Λ
for Reed-Solomon code of N variables. First we take multiplication of
matrices
[x1 . . . xN ]×
 λN...
λ1
 ,
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then we permute rows of the matrix Λ (and accordingly the codeword’s
bits xi) in the following way (it’s possible because of Lemma 4.3):
0 . . . 01
...
0 . . . 01
}
n
...
1 . . . 11
...
1 . . . 11
}
n

Now the task is to multiply the matrices and to check if we have
zero-vector as a result. It is equivalent to verifying the following check-
sums:
y1 =
∑
λi[1]=1
xi
...
yn =
∑
λi[n]=1
xi
λi[j] denotes the j-th element in vector λi. The sums are calculated
modulo 2.
If each yi is equal to 0, then the result of the multiplication is
zero-vector.
Let’s evaluate the complexity (i.e. the number of queries) for even
n.
For any i, we take input variables x2i−1 and x2i and calculate x2i−1⊕
x2i. We use this result in those checksums where this pair occurs. It is
easy to see that if one variable of the pair belongs to some checksum
then also the other variable belongs to the same checksum. So we need
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N/2 queries to evaluate the function.
Theorem 4.5. There is an exact quantum query algorithm for function
f with complexity n · (2n − 1)/2 + (2n−1 − 1)/2− 2n−2 for odd n.
Proof. In the case of odd n we begin like we did when n was even. So
we represent the task as multiplication of matrices and then permute
rows of a matrix Λ in the following way:
0 . . . 01
...
0 . . . 01
}
n− 1
...
1 . . . 11
...
1 . . . 11
}
n− 1

A
0 . . . 01
...
1 . . . 11
B

We use the algorithm from the previous theorem to calculate those
parts of the checksums which contain the first (n−1)(2n−1) variables
(see part A above) of the codeword. The remaining variables represent
subsums equivalent to the Hamming code checksums (see part B above)
which can be calculated with 2n − 1 − 2n−2 queries. In total we have
(n− 1)(2n − 1)/2 + 2n− 1− 2n−2 = n · (2n− 1)/2 + (2n−1− 1)/2− 2n−2
queries for odd n.
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Figure 4.2: A quantum query algorithm for the Reed-Solomon code
function RS(7, 5) of 21 arguments.
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Figure 4.2 visualizes the quantum algorithm for the Reed-Solomon
code of 21 arguments.
4.4 Lower Bound by Polynomials
We will begin with finding the degree of f which helps us to prove the
lower bound by polynomials.
Theorem 4.6. deg(f) = n · 2n−1.
Proof. We prove this fact using Dirichlet principle and by constructing
Reed-Solomon code from several Hamming codes. It is similar to proof
for degree of Hamming code function. It is based on linearity of Reed-
Solomon codes.
Similarly as in the proof of Theorem 3.4 we will express the poly-
nomial of f as p(x1, . . . , xN) =
∑
b:f(b)=1
∏
i:bi=1
xi
∏
i:bi=0
(1− xi). In
this formula each summand corresponds to a particular Reed-Solomon
code vector b.
Similarly as for the Hamming code proof we open all the parenthe-
ses (1−xi) to get sum of monomials and investigate in which summands
a particular monomial occurs. First we need to prove that for I ⊆ [N ]
the same monomial
∏
i∈I xi of size more than n ·2n−1 appears the same
number of times with positive sign as with negative sign. This reduces
to the prove that among the Reed-Solomon codes with 0’s in all the
positions not from I, the number of codes with even Hamming weight
coincides with the number of codes with odd Hamming weight. Reed-
Solomon codes are also linear, so similarly like we did for Hamming
codes it is enough to prove that among the above codewords there is
a code c with Hamming weight 3.
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We proved in Lemma 4.3 that rows of the matrix Λ are all possible
n-bit vectors except zero-vector and each vector occurs exactly n times.
This means that we can split all these rows into n sets of size n in such
a way that each set contains all possible n-bit vectors. According to
Lemma 3.1 each of the sets represents a checking matrix for verifying
a Hamming code.
We can divide all the arguments of the Reed-Solomon code into
groups which correspond to the Hamming code checking matrices. We
denote this set of groups by G. Since there are only n distinct groups
and I > n · 2n−1 then by Dirichlet principle one of the groups will have
at least 2n−1 + 1 representatives in I. We already proved in Theorem
3.4 that there is a codeword with Hamming weight 3 in such a group.
Now we similarly as in Theorem 3.4 need to prove that there is a
monomial with card(I) = n · 2n−1 and non-zero coefficient. We use
the same grouping G as above. In each of the groups g ∈ G we can
find such set of indices Jg of size 2
n−1, where if h is a valid Hamming
code then ⊕j∈Jhj = 0. Now we make the set I = ∪g∈GJg. The number
of 0’s and 1’s in positions from I is even because they need to satisfy
the checksum ⊕i∈Ibj = 0 for b to be a valid Reed-Solomon code and
because card(I) = n·2n−1 is an even number. Monomial corresponding
to this set of indices appears only with coefficients +1 and thus cannot
cancel (and it occurs at least once - for the all-zero Reed-Solomon
code).
Corollary 4.7. The lower bound by polynomials for Reed-Solomon
code function is: QE(f) ≥ n · 2n−2.
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Conclusion
In the conclusion we will summarize all the items which were discussed
in the thesis.
We investigated possibilities to implement quantum algorithms for
the Hamming and Reed-Solomon code functions. We investigated com-
plexity of the algorithms and their possible implementations.
Several results were achieved in this area. I think the most impor-
tant result is that we found a better quantum algorithm for evaluating
Hamming code functions. The algorithm reduces number of queries
by 25% compared to the best possible classical algorithm. It’s not the
world best achievement for reducing classical complexity by an exact
quantum algorithm. The best known achievement is an algorithm for
XOR (Deutsch’s) function which reduces the number of queries by one
half. From the other hand there is not so many algorithms known
which achieve improvement similar to what we got for the Hamming
codes functions.
For the Reed-Solomon functions we were able to reduce queries
count by one half. This is the same improvement as for the XOR. I
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think that the main value of the investigation is in showing how to
reduce Reed-Solomon function to use XOR as a subroutine.
We have found a polynomial lower bound for the both function
classes. The bound is not tight, but it is tight enough to see that the
classical deterministic algorithms can be improved only by a constant
factor.
We also found a lower bound by spectral adversary methods for
Hamming code function of seven arguments. Positive adversary gave
us lower bound of 2.09 and negative adversary increased it to 2.17.
Both these numbers mean that at least three queries are required for
an exact algorithm to evaluate them. This lower bound is higher than
the polynomial one for the same function.
Obviously there is an additional work possible in this area. The
immediate desire is to apply adversary method to Hamming code func-
tions of more arguments and also for Reed-Solomon code functions.
Some investigations still possible to minimize the gap between lower
bounds and algorithms complexity.
There is a related work done for other error correcting codes in
[Va 09]. It may be of interest to find a lower bound for the functions
in that work by applying the techniques from this research.
Another activity could be to extend this approach to a broader class
of error correcting codes and define which of them can be reduced to
using XOR as a subroutine.
All these activities may lead either to improvement of lower bound
estimations or even provide some idea for implementing more efficient
exact quantum algorithms.
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Appendix A
The Matlab Program
Following is the source code of a Matlab program calculating the opti-
mal adversary lower bound of a Hamming code function. The program
uses sedumi package for solving semidefinite programming problems.
Visit
http://sedumi.ie.lehigh.edu for more information about the pack-
age.
function x = hammingAdversary(N, positive)
% N - length of the code vectors
% positive - if true then the positive adversary will be returned,
% otherwise will return the negative adversary
% count of variables to be optimized.
% We have one variable for each set of code vectors of the
% same size.
% This is based on conjecture that all not valid code vectors
% of the same size
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% can be get from one another by a permutation of bits.
% This conjecture is proved for the code of size seven
variablesCount = N-1;
% entry (of not reversed) D(i,j) is equal to entry
% Gamma(i,j+indent);
indent = 2^(N-1);
% columns count in D
colsCount = 2^(N-1);
% supporting structure for constructing input of sedumi
rows = [];
cols = [];
s = [];
b = [];
% by D we denote Gamma * D1, where "*" is entrywise
% multiplication
D = zeros(N,N);
for i=1:colsCount
for j=1:colsCount
iG = i; %row index in Gamma
jG = (indent + j); %column index in Gamma
if (isHamming(iG-1) == isHamming(jG-1))
% reversing columns order of D, we need it to have
% all zeros on the diagonal
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% this operation doesn’t change the norm
D(i,colsCount-j+1) = 0;
else
codeVector = bitxor(j-1,(indent + i)-1);
dec2bin(codeVector);
% reversing columns order of D, we need it to have
% all zeros on the diagonal
% this operation doesn’t change the norm
D(i,colsCount-j+1) = sum(dec2bin(codeVector) == ’1’);
end
end
end
% I-D>0 - the constraint that I-D is positive semidefinite
for i=1:colsCount
for j=1:colsCount
if (D(i,j)==0)
rows = [rows (i-1)*colsCount+j];
cols = [cols (i-1)*colsCount+j+variablesCount];
s = [s 1];
if (i == j)
b = [b 1];
else
b = [b 0];
end
else
rows = [rows (i-1)*colsCount+j (i-1)*colsCount+j];
cols = [cols D(i,j) (i-1)*colsCount+j+variablesCount];
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s = [s 1 1];
b = [b 0];
end
end
end
A=sparse(rows, cols, s);
weightsDistribution = wordsDistributionByWeight(N);
c = -1*ones(1,variablesCount);
for i=1:variablesCount
% optimizing the sum of free variables
c(i) = -1 * (nchoosek(N,i)-weightsDistribution(i+1))/N;
end
c = [c zeros(1,colsCount*colsCount)];
if(positive)
K.l = variablesCount;
else
K.f = variablesCount;
end
K.s = colsCount;
x = sedumi(A, b, c, K);
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The function for detecting valid hamming codewords. The code
words are reversed, but it doesn’t have impact on the result.
function x = isHamming(codeVector)
codeVectorLength = length(dec2bin(codeVector));
result = 0;
for i=1:codeVectorLength
if (bitget(codeVector,i) == 1)
result = bitxor(result,i);
end
end
x = (result == 0);
APPENDIX A. THE MATLAB PROGRAM 76
The function for determining valid codewords distribution by weight.
function x = wordsDistributionByWeight(N)
result = zeros(1,N+1);
totalCodeVectors = 2^N;
for i=0:totalCodeVectors-1
if(isHamming(i))
weight = sum(dec2bin(i) == ’1’);
result(weight+1) = result(weight+1) + 1;
end
end
x = result;
